r/askphilosophy

Ahoi there,

I am not deeply invested in philosophy and via some edgy youtube rabbit holes I got around to reading E.M. Cioran these past few years and have to say:

Yes, it's dark, but maaan... the language is absolutely beautiful and stunning.

There's much I don't understand, from what I understand, there's lots of things, I disagree with, but it really is such a great read. My native tongue is german and there is some Cioran translated by Paul Celan which are my favorite texts so far.

So with that background: Do you know any philosophers with a similar essayistich approach? That use language as more than to convey meaning?

Any hint will be appreciated!

Cheers!

in discussions of concepts like logic, reason, language, truth, and evidence. When someone tries to criticize or reject them, the criticism often seems to rely on the very concept being criticized. For example, arguments against logic appear to use logic, arguments against reason appear to use reasoning, and so on.

Is this because these concepts are genuinely inescapable preconditions of thought and discourse, or because their meanings are often broadened so much that almost any criticism automatically counts as an instance of them?

Is there a recognized philosophical literature or term for this kind of problem?

I recently saw a post on this subreddit from around a day ago about , and it was enough to prompt me to ask a related question.

I’m a bit familiar with analytic metaphysical theories of gender (primarily in Sally Haslanger‘s work) through a class I took back when I was an undergrad where we covered the metaphysics of race, which has a bit of overlap with gender, using some of same arguments for race as for gender (at least with Haslanger). I also am aware of some secondary research like Judith Butler’s ideas of gender as performance or that sex too is socially constructed although I have never read their work. Either way, I’m not sure if any of them have covered the following concern:

As I understand it, a massive discovery of the second-wave feminist movement was that gender roles were bunk and more broadly one’s (gender) expression did not have to correspond to one’s gender identity or sex, which were still tightly coupled under a gender essentialist framework (and is why many second-wave feminists were or are sometimes TERF’s). This discovery gave a lot of steam to the gay liberation movement as a lot of gay men were free to be more femme-presenting (like twinks and femboys) and a lot of lesbian women were free to be more masc-presenting (like butch lesbians). (Obviously, there is still a ton of political repression. By “free,” I mean more in the sense of being comfortable within a community rather than being free from violence or persecution.) After this, the gay and trans liberation movement came into the limelight (particularly with Stonewall), and the experiences of trans people made it clear that one’s gender identity does not have to correspond to one’s sex either. Many trans people try to bring their gender expression and sex into alignment with this identity (through first socially and then sexually transitioning, respectively). Notably though, one can be trans without feeling gender dysphoria. All that is required is that one’s gender identity does not correspond to one’s sex, and neither does one’s gender identity have to correspond to expression. Someone can be a woman without being female or femme-presenting, and they may have no desire to transition (even though, often in these cases, there would still be gender euphoria associated with transitioning).

In short, the reason I bring all this is up is that my main concern following all of this is that if gender identity does not have to correspond to sex nor gender expression, then it isn’t clear to me that it has any meaning. It seems to me that gender terms like “man” or “woman” may be an empty signifier without any content, and this would lend credence to an anti-realist view of gender identity (even if gender expression is socially constructed). Gender identity is seen as this private feeling in the mind, but I don’t see what this private feeling could convey since it doesn’t have to lead to a desire towards an alteration or change in either gender expression or sex (although often it does). These latter two things can vary independently, and gender identity then would be akin to Wittgenstein’s beetle in a box. I know there is some science on brain waves in trans vs cis people that show how cis and trans men have the same brain waves and vice versa for cis and trans women. Non-binary people have brain waves between men and women. (There is also some studies on gray and white matter in the brain, but these are outdated as far as I’m aware.) In this sense, gender identity could be seen as a kind of “mental sex” (as per a psychological realism of gender). But it doesn’t make sense to me why this would then lead to a desire to change one’s sex or gender expression (and sometimes not at all as per my example). They are different and yet seemingly connected in some cases.

I was just wondering if this is a good argument for an anti-realist view or who else in the literature has made arguments like mine, against mine, or raised similar concerns.