Talk:Ontological argument

Plain false definiens?

Anselm defines God = a being than which none greater can be imagined. But can there be a being than none greater can be imagined? Assume there is such God. But we could always add the natural number 1 to God and God + 1 would be greater than God. So by Anselms very definition there cannot be God since there cannot be a being which none greater can be imagined. Is that not a much more simple & straightforward destruction of the ontological argument, but then why do I not read about it? Did no philosopher think about it or do I miss something? Rs220675 (talk) 22:51, 26 May 2022 (UTC)

1. There is a God (that which nothing greater can be conceived)

2. Add 1 to God

3. God+1

conc. there cannot be that which nothing greater can be conceived.

That is not a valid argument.

Additionally, you could not "add the natural number 1 to God" since God is infinite and trying to apply mathematical actions to infinity is undoable. Your assumption described in the sentence, "Assume there is such a God" doesn't really assume God is that which none greater can be imagined. A truly infinite God would remain unchanged by mathematical actions, just like infinity. Govln (talk) 13:47, 2 May 2025 (UTC)

There is no consensus about Anselm NOT being the originator of the ontological argument

I've never heard any Philosopher suggest that Anselm wasn't the first to form the ontological argument. This Wikipedia article makes the claim that he wasn't, and it links to the opinion of ONE person who thinks otherwise. That's not a "consensus", as this Wikipedia article claims. The source itself even says Oppy doesn't agree, so, again, there is no consensus.

That's a fringe view. 2601:840:8681:9690:0:0:0:B103 (talk) 17:10, 13 August 2022 (UTC)

Reconstruction of Plantinga missing proper source

In the section on Plantinga, there is the following reconstruction of Plantinga's argument:

A version of his argument may be formulated as follows:

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
3. It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)
4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists.
5. Therefore, (by axiom 5 of S5) it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

I've been trying to track this reconstructiuon down and I have not been able to find it in the source cited for it. Neither the original version, the spring 2011 edition, the fall 2011 edition nor the spring 2024 include this reconstruction. If someone knows where this reconstruction is from, please provide more citation information, so it can be found. Otherwise, I think it should perhaps be deleted, even though it is correct. Applesandoranges501 (talk) 15:25, 26 September 2024 (UTC)

Here is the edit that (re-)introduced the passage in question. It seems to cite E. Craig in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy instead—no idea how things got jumbled up later. Remsense ‥ 论 15:36, 26 September 2024 (UTC)

Thanks for digging this up!

I've had a look at the article cited from Craig's Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (the DOI is: 10.4324/9780415249126-K029-1). It was written by Plantinga but it does not contain that reconstruction. He doesn't even talk about his own argument, rather, he only refers to Hartshorne's. And what he does reconstruct of Hartshorne's argument, he reconstructs in terms of instantiations of maximal greatness (rather than maximally great beings). Technically, this isn't a huge problem, given that Plantinga himself writes in God, Freedom and Evil that his talk about maximally great beings and instantiations of maximal greatness are interchangeable (cf. Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, p.102). Nevertheless, that reconstruction is missing a source. Applesandoranges501 (talk) 21:29, 26 September 2024 (UTC)

Modal ontological argument

I don't see the modal ontological argument addressed anywhere in this article. Shouldn't we add that? Python Drink (talk) 23:48, 8 November 2025 (UTC)

Ontological continuum (physicalism)

cyclic cosmology and Everettism usually combined.

Rejecting Everettism is egocentric/monocentric.

Alternative correct arrangements don't originate from nothing or infinite energy but from logical achievability (ex logica). ~2026-21046-07 (talk) 19:38, 5 April 2026 (UTC)

Unless you WP:CITE WP:RS, we can do nothing with your opinion. tgeorgescu (talk) 19:53, 5 April 2026 (UTC)