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Muhammad al-Badr

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Muhammad al-Badr
محمد البدر
Imam and Commander of the Faithful and King of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen
Al-Badr in 1962
King and Imam of Yemen
Reign26 September 1962 – 1 December 1970 [a]
PredecessorAhmad bin Yahya
SuccessorTitle abolished (Abdullah al-Sallal as President of the Yemen Arab Republic[b])
BornAl-Mansur Bi'llah Muhammad Al-Badr bin Al-Nasir-li-dinu'llah Ahmad
(1926-02-15)15 February 1926
Sanaa, Kingdom of Yemen
Died6 August 1996(1996-08-06) (aged 70)
London, United Kingdom
Burial
Medina, Saudi Arabia
IssueAgeel bin Muhammad al-Badr
Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Badr
HouseRassids
FatherAhmad bin Yahya
ReligionZaydi Shia Islam

Muhammad al-Badr[c] (15 February 1926 – 6 August 1996) was the last king and Zaydi Imam of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen (North Yemen) and leader of the monarchist regions during the North Yemen Civil War (1962–1970).

He was Imam and Commander of the Faithful and King of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen.[1][2]

Early life

[edit]

Al-Badr was born in 1926 in the town of Hajjah in north-west Yemen, as oldest son of Ahmad bin Yahya, later imam of the Zaydis and king of North Yemen. His father was governor of Hajjah. Al-Badr was named as deputy over Hodeidah. He took the name Sayf al-Islam al-Badr.[1]

In 1955 Ahmad bin Yahya forged connections and signed agreements during a tour to Soviet bloc countries. In April 1956 he signed a mutual defence pact with Egypt, involving a unified military command, and in 1958 incorporated Yemen with the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria into what then became the United Arab States.[3][4]

On 8 March 1958, Nasser and Prince Muhammad al-Badr signed a pact in Syria creating the United Arab States, a federation linking Yemen with the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria).[5] Yemen retained its independence and the ability to act against Egypt in foreign policy. Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer was appointed commander-in-chief of the federation's joint forces.[6]

Relations with the Soviet Union

[edit]

According to historical accounts, Soviet economic delegations established a working relationship with Crown Prince al-Badr during a period when the Free Yemeni Movement was actively opposing Imam Ahmad's rule.[7] Al-Badr sought to modernize Yemen and was prepared to cooperate with any nation offering developmental assistance. He publicly identified with Nasser's Arab nationalist ideology and responded positively to Soviet economic overtures.[7]

Several of al-Badr's relatives held unfavorable views of him. His cousin, Abdullah ibn al-Hussein, reportedly characterized al-Badr as "dissolute, incompetent, and gullible."[8] A Soviet physician working in Yemen in 1961 later wrote about a parade in Sana'a where al-Badr was honored by mounted soldiers and tanks, while surrounded by bodyguards dressed in blue.[9]

During the 1950s, Soviet strategy in Yemen was characterized by small-scale, long-term planning with minimal risk. In 1955, the USSR concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Yemen. Imam Ahmad received sufficient light weaponry to conduct attacks against British forces, but not enough to initiate a major conflict that would require direct Soviet involvement. Moscow's calculation was that continued dependence on Soviet weapons would make Yemen reliant on Soviet technicians, spare parts, and future shipments.[10] Soviet officials encouraged Ahmad to attack British positions — an action he would likely have taken regardless. A decisive British victory appeared improbable, and periodic Yemeni attacks had the potential to erode Britain's regional position.[10]

Moscow viewed Yemen as a potential staging ground for Soviet expansion into the Arabian Peninsula at the expense of Western interests.[11] Vladimir Sakharov, a Soviet diplomat assigned to the Yemen Arab Republic who later defected to the United States in 1971, explained that the USSR maintained no diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia or the Gulf sheikhdoms at that time. He stated that North Yemen and South Arabia were seen as a Soviet entry point into both the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea.[12]

A bilateral trade agreement signed in 1956 between Yemen and the Soviet Union initiated several infrastructure projects, including factories for cement, leather processing, juice production, and metal packaging, as well as an oil storage depot and a new port facility at Hodeidah. Soviet trade delegations monitored the implementation of these projects in January and March 1956.[13] A credit line of $3.5 million was extended to Yemen. In July 1956, al-Badr led a well-publicized Yemeni delegation of twelve ministers to Moscow to formalize military and economic cooperation — the first visit of any Arab leader to the USSR.[14] During the same trip, al-Badr also visited East Berlin from 25 June to 2 July 1956 as a guest of the East German government.[15] Al-Badr obtained his father's permission to tour China, the Soviet Union, and other Eastern European countries only after demonstrating his reliability by rallying tribal allies following the failed 1955 coup attempt.[16]

The first Soviet diplomatic mission opened in Ta'izz in January 1958. The Soviet ambassador to the United Arab Republic was concurrently asked to serve as chargé d'affaires for Yemen, which led to a second Yemeni delegation traveling to Moscow in 1959.[17] Following that visit, China dispatched engineers and laborers to construct roads in Yemen, while the Soviet Union sent specialists to begin work on the port at Hodeidah.[18]

In 1957, only fifty Soviet and Chinese specialists were present in Yemen. By 1959, the number had grown to six hundred Chinese and several hundred Russians. By 1960, more than 1,100 Chinese laborers were employed on Yemeni road projects.[19] The new Hodeidah facility, named Port Ahmad, required 300,000 tons of modern construction materials and was designed to store 9,000 tons of oil. The surrounding area was to be equipped with electricity, mechanized factories, vehicles, and Soviet technicians. Yemen received an additional $2 million credit for these projects.[17]

Soviet press reports covered the arrival of tractors, excavators, and other heavy machinery at the port site, stating that Soviet-Yemeni friendship and fraternal cooperation had grown. According to Soviet media, the two countries had together achieved "a new brightness" in completing Port Ahmad as "a port of peace and friendship."[20]

Moscow supported Ahmad despite describing his country as "feudal" and his rule as an absolute theocracy. Soviet officials considered his palace "modest" and acknowledged his efforts to improve public health. However, according to academic sources, the primary target of Soviet foreign policy was al-Badr, who preferred rapid modernization with Soviet assistance.[21]

In the spring of 1962, al-Badr organized another trade delegation to Moscow to accept a Soviet proposal to use Yemen as a transit point for oil shipments to Africa.[22] His pro-Soviet orientation was clearly expressed in a speech he delivered in June 1962 at the opening ceremony of Port Ahmad in Hodeidah, less than four months before the revolution. He began with poetic verses celebrating the Yemeni people's achievement in building the port. He then praised the Soviet Union for its assistance, stating: "We and the Soviet People — Brothers, you are the most true and faithful of our friends … Many thanks to the Soviet government for their generous help to Yemen."[23] Later in the same speech, he added: "Port Ahmad is the first of projects that are needed to carry out the service for the benefit of our own country … thank our dear friends."[24]

In his Port Ahmad address, al-Badr characterized the facility as merely the first of many future Yemeni-Soviet projects, indicating his desire for a long-term relationship between the two countries. In a eulogy for his father delivered on 21 September 1962, al-Badr claimed that Ahmad's dying wish was to "adopt socialist economic, military, and political standards for the people."[25] Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev echoed this sentiment, describing Ahmad as having "made a worthy contribution to the cause of consolidating the political and economic independence of Yemen."[26]

Armin H. Meyer, a former American ambassador to Iran, referred to al-Badr as the "red prince." According to Meyer, al-Badr had grown impatient with the West, traveled to Moscow where he was entertained, and proceeded to procure arms from the Soviets. Months later, when al-Badr was overthrown by recipients of those same weapons, the Soviets quickly recognized his successors without public regret.[27] David Holden, the Middle East correspondent for The Guardian, described al-Badr as "woolly-minded" — sincerely anxious to reform his country but lacking a clear understanding of how to do so or what passions such reforms might unleash. Holden concluded that al-Badr's good intentions ultimately paved the way to his downfall.[28]

Relations with Gamal Nasser

[edit]

According to al-Badr's own later account, Nasser recruited him for a plot to overthrow his father and secure an Egyptian presence on the Arabian Peninsula.[29] During a lengthy conversation with British MP Neil McLean in the civil war, al-Badr admitted that his naivety and overconfidence had nearly led him to sacrifice his father and Yemeni independence for what he called empty promises. According to the same account, Nasser had cultivated al-Badr as a protégé during his repeated trips to Cairo, hoping to gain a Nasserist ally in South Arabia.[30]

Some scholars suggest that al-Badr may have exaggerated certain details to justify his earlier pro-Egyptian and pro-Soviet stances. The fact that he told these stories at length to McLean — who passed them to the British mercenary network in Yemen — indicates a possible desire to explain his past actions. Nevertheless, his account matches his known travel itinerary and provides context for meetings that otherwise lack official documentation.[30]

Regardless of the exact accuracy of every word, the confession reveals al-Badr's mindset and that of his British supporters. Al-Badr portrayed himself as an unwitting victim of Nasser's plotting. The British, for their part, attempted to convince critics that their imperfect ally had genuinely turned away from his earlier anti-British and pro-Nasser policies and was now worthy of their backing.[31]

Al-Badr and Nasser first met in 1954 during a two-month visit to Cairo. Following that meeting, Nasser announced a large aid programme for Yemen. During another trip to Cairo in 1955, al-Badr met with the local branch of the Yemeni Union and cultivated a group of supporters within the Free Yemeni Movement.[32] On his third visit to Cairo in 1956 to sign the Jeddah Defence Pact with Egypt, al-Badr promoted thirteen Yemeni cadets from an Egyptian military school to the rank of first lieutenant. Several months later, after graduation, the cadets arrived in Yemen and were personally greeted by al-Badr at Hodeidah port.

One of the thirteen, Abd al-Latif Dayfallah — a future Yemeni prime minister — later recalled: "The thirteen Yemeni officers — by the way the same number as the Egyptian Free Officers — was quickly being molded into the Egyptian model. The Egyptian Free Officers movement which overthrew the monarchy in Egypt was something we emulated."[33] Dayfallah and Abdullah Juzaylan (also among the thirteen) were instrumental in forming the Yemeni Free Officer movement in 1960. This group of young officers later became the core of the September 1962 overthrow of the imam.[34]

After Yemen officially joined the United Arab Republic in 1958, al-Badr travelled to Damascus to meet Tito, Nasser, Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli, and Egyptian officials including Ali Sabri, Abd al-Hakim Amer and Anwar Sadat. They discussed plans for a revolution against his father, Imam Ahmad. According to al-Badr, Nasser stated his intention to turn Yemen into a base for Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism in Arabia. Nasser allegedly promised to send al-Badr two cases of pistols, Egyptian £25,000 (about $79,000), and an additional £50,000 sterling after the revolution was completed.[35]

Later that year, Nasser called al-Badr on a private wireless transmitter installed in al-Badr's Sana'a palace. He instructed him to meet Abd al-Salam Arif, the Iraqi Arab nationalist leader and Nasser supporter, in Baghdad for further instructions. Iraqi Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim repeatedly interrupted their meetings and refused to leave them alone, possibly fearing that they were plotting against his own rule. Qasim personally intercepted Arif's final attempt to deliver a letter to al-Badr, and the visit ended with nothing achieved.[35]

In 1959, al-Badr was again summoned to Alexandria and taken by car to an isolated house near Borg el-Arab. He arrived just as a group of men were departing. Nasser explained that they were Saudi dissidents seeking to overthrow King Saud. In what was likely a planned performance, Nasser led al-Badr to believe that he had plans to overthrow the Saudi royal family and possibly restore the territory Yemen had lost in 1934. Al-Badr and Nasser then returned to Cairo to meet with Algerian FLN leaders Ferhat Abbas and Benyoucef Benkhedda, who outlined the intended role for Algerian commandos and saboteurs. Soviet naval agents also proposed sending a fleet to Hodeidah to block any American or British intervention during a Yemeni revolution.[35]

According to Neil McLean, Nasser reached an agreement with the Algerian FLN to send volunteers to Yemen and organise terrorist activities against Aden through training camps in Egypt. In the first phase of this plan, Nasser would occupy Yemen and establish a government ready to join the UAR.[36] In the second phase, he would undermine the Saudi monarchy and arm opposition groups in Aden and Saudi Arabia, sparking an Arab socialist revolution on the Arabian Peninsula. In the third and final phase, Egypt would occupy the Persian Gulf and gain access to oil revenues. The Russians and Chinese reportedly approved the plan, as it suited their own objective of weakening Arab-Western ties.[37] Parts of this account were later confirmed in October 1962 by a wounded Egyptian paratrooper, who told interrogators that Nasser had informed them they were going to Yemen to fight the British in Aden.[37]

At al-Badr's urging, Imam Ahmad's Italian doctors declared him incapacitated owing to a morphine addiction.[38] From April to August 1959, the ailing imam flew to Rome for medical treatment, leaving his son in charge. Al-Badr invited Egyptian advisers and technicians to the country[21] and promised substantial pay raises to army officers. However, when the officers realized that al-Badr lacked sufficient funds to fulfil these promises, a political crisis ensued.

Ahmad flew back and ordered all Egyptian advisers to leave, fearing they had orchestrated a coup against al-Badr in his absence. He summoned Ahmad Abu-Zeid, the Egyptian ambassador to Yemen, and warned that unless the Egyptians stopped plotting, he would permanently expel them from the country — following the example of his father, Imam Yahya. During a face-to-face meeting with Abu-Zeid, Ahmad tore up the civil air agreement recently signed between the two countries, which had permitted Egyptian airlines to fly over Yemeni airspace.[37] He also attempted to recover bribes that al-Badr had distributed to the tribes, but this only further alienated his tribal allies, who had become more sympathetic to the Free Yemeni Movement.

Several unsuccessful assassination attempts marked the final years of Ahmad's life. During his last year, he made enemies of both local tribes and Nasser — a combination that would prove disastrous for his unprepared crown prince.[39] Making matters worse for al-Badr, after his failed reform attempt and based on suspicious evidence of his dealings with the Soviets, Ahmad essentially confined his son to the country and refused to permit him to travel abroad.

According to al-Badr's confession as documented by McLean, he again spoke with Nasser in late 1961. He explained that he was confined to the country, watched by his father's confidants, and unable to coordinate a revolution. Nasser replied that he would "take care of it" and arranged for Chinese labourers to ship unmarked boxes of guns and explosives disguised as road-building equipment.[40]

In spring 1962, the Egyptians prematurely spread a rumour that a plot against the imam was imminent. Nasser sent an urgent telegram to al-Badr asking him to kill his father. Realizing that he had become too deeply involved, al-Badr finally confessed the details of the plot to his father. Ahmad forgave him but instructed him to end his relationship with Egypt and instead focus on improving Yemeni relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan — possibly by joining the Pact of Ta'if recently signed between the two kings. Several weeks before Ahmad's death, al-Badr led a Yemeni delegation to Saudi Arabia to negotiate Yemen's entry into the Ta'if Pact. Meanwhile, Ahmad expelled the Egyptian ambassador, leaving behind only the diplomat Muhammad Abd al-Wahhad.[40]

On the day of his father's death, al-Badr received an ultimatum from Nasser and a personal visit from Abd al-Wahhad demanding immediate union with Egypt. Before al-Badr had time to consider his options, his palace was shelled.[40]

According to Ali Abd al-Rahman Rahmy, an Egyptian officer who served in the Yemen Civil War: "In Cairo, al-Badr was attracted by Nasser, to a point where he was convinced he had Nasser's personal friendship … and wished to emulate the Egyptian leader as much as possible."[41] Similarly, Aden High Commissioner Kennedy Trevaskis remarked in 1961 that both British colonial officials and Zaydi tribal authorities viewed al-Badr as a protégé of Nasser.[42]

In March 1961, Imam Ahmad was badly injured in an assassination attempt. He died on 19 September 1962. Al-Badr was then proclaimed Imam and King, taking the title of al-Mansur.[43][44][45]

Political situation in Yemen before the revolution

[edit]

During the final years of Imam Ahmad's rule, widespread disturbances occurred throughout the country. He began to lose control, and armed clashes increased between his forces and rebellious tribes, as well as between his forces and students. From May 1962, numerous student demonstrations and marches took place in Sana'a and other Yemeni cities, continuing despite being met with bullets from police forces, which resulted in many students dead or wounded.[46][47]

Imam Ahmad died on 18 September 1962. Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr became Imam of Yemen, taking the title "Al-Mansur Billah". Al-Badr, aware of the growing opposition, announced his intention to carry out comprehensive reforms. He denounced his father's repressive policies,[48] issued a general amnesty for prisoners and political exiles, abolished taxes and the hostage system, increased army salaries, ordered the establishment of a forty-member Shura Council, and called for the formation of elected municipal councils. He appointed himself Prime Minister to expedite these measures, but the reforms came too late. Al-Badr subsequently announced that he would follow the same policy as his father and use force against anyone who attempted to undermine his rule.[49]

As the opposition prepared for a revolution, some called for delaying the uprising until al-Hassan[50] and other members of the Imamate family who were abroad had returned, so that all elements of the Imamate regime could be eliminated at once. However, the majority of opposition figures favoured an immediate declaration of revolution, fearing that al-Badr and his circle might pre-empt them by purging revolutionary elements. This concern appeared justified when, on the evening of 25 September 1962, the Council of Ministers decided to withdraw all weapons from army barracks, execute fifteen officers, liquidate others, and close all military schools.[51]

Formation of the Revolutionary Leadership and the Coup Plan

[edit]

By 1962, preparatory movements to overthrow the Mutawakkilite monarchy had accelerated. Immediately prior to the revolution, at least four distinct factions were actively plotting against the Imamate: two rooted within the prominent Hashid and Bakil tribal confederations, and two operating within the military under the auspices of the Free Officers Sub-organization.[52]

To maximize the chances of success, the Free Officers sought a prominent military figure with established nationalist credentials to lead the movement. The organization initially approached Hamoud al-Jaifi in Hodeidah.[53][54] However, al-Jaifi expressed caution, warning against premature action. He advocated for more thorough military preparations and suggested delaying the uprising until all senior members of the ruling Hamid al-Din family, particularly Prince al-Hassan, had returned to Yemen from abroad. Despite these reservations, he affirmed his baseline support for the revolutionary cause.[55]

Following al-Jaifi's hesitation, the organization shifted its focus toward Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal.[56] This proposal faced internal pushback; several officers objected to al-Sallal, re-nominating al-Jaifi,[57] while others suggested choosing a leader from within the organization's immediate ranks.[55] In an attempt to resolve the deadlock, the Free Officers dispatched Abdullah Juzaylan[54] and Ahmad al-Rahoumi to Hodeidah to reconsider al-Jaifi, but he firmly maintained his cautious stance.[58]

Subsequently, a joint meeting was convened between the Free Officers and the broader "Free Yemenis" movement, attended by Muhammad Abdullah al-Fusayl as a representative of the opposition-in-exile. The committee ultimately selected Abdullah al-Sallal to lead the revolution. This choice was largely pragmatic, dictated by al-Sallal's strategic military appointments: he commanded the Royal Guard and the Badr forces, and controlled both the primary weapons depot and the strategic fortifications of Jebel al-Naqm.[59] When approached by Abdul Salam Sabrah on behalf of the revolutionaries, al-Sallal accepted the leadership role unconditionally.[60][55]

A final logistical meeting was later held at the house of Abdullah Abdul Salam Sabrah to finalize the plot; al-Sallal was absent to avoid raising suspicion. The session was attended by prominent figures of the movement, including Ali Abdul Mughni, Hussein al-Sukari, Naji Wasal al-Ashoul, and Sabrah himself. During this meeting, "zero hour" was scheduled for the evening of Wednesday, 26 September 1962.

The tactical plan assigned Lieutenant Hussein al-Sukari, the deputy commander of al-Badr's guard, to assassinate Imam al-Badr as he exited a Council of Ministers meeting. Simultaneously, the Free Officers were to mobilize their respective units, seize control of the state radio station and sensitive government installations in Sana'a, and formally announce the collapse of the Imamate.[61]

The leadership also briefed select sons of tribal sheikhs and the regional command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party,[62] which maintained continuous contact with the Free Officers during the planning phases. However, some internal dissent remained; notably, Abdullah al-Karshumi expressed reservations regarding the timing and did not participate in the execution of the plan.[56]

Coup of 26 September 1962

[edit]

On the evening of 25 September 1962, Hussein al-Sukari fired his automatic rifle at Imam al-Badr as the latter was leaving a meeting. The rifle jammed, and the assassination attempt failed.[56] The officers and revolutionary forces then moved at midnight. Their plan consisted of surrounding al-Badr's residence (Al-Tashrir Palace) and shelling it if he refused to surrender; securing all strategic sites in Sana'a, Taiz and Hodeidah; seizing the radio station; surrounding Al-Salawl Palace; and arresting all key elements of the Imamate regime.[63]

The Free Officers began implementing the plan on 26 September 1962.[63] Revolutionary forces fought battles with al-Badr's guard and gained the upper hand after shelling Al-Tashrir Palace. As the shelling intensified, al-Badr fled the palace disguised in soldiers' clothing, accompanied by some family members and guards.[64] He subsequently reached Saudi Arabia.[65]

Abdullah al-Sallal was informed of the revolution at dawn on 26 September through Abdul Salam Sabrah and was asked to lead it. After the revolution's success, Ahmad al-Rahoumi and a group of officers transported al-Sallal from his house to the leadership headquarters in an armoured vehicle, where he assumed the presidency of the Revolutionary Command Council. His first act was to order the guards of Al-Salawl Palace to supply the revolutionaries with tank ammunition and other weapons.[66]

The radio station announced the fall of the Imamate and the establishment of the "Yemen Arab Republic". By the end of 26 September, the revolutionaries had secured all vital state facilities in the capital and beyond, and arrested most elements of the previous regime.[67] Approximately 33 tribal sheikhs participated in the revolution to support and defend it.[68] Among the military figures who planned the revolution were Abdullah al-Sallal, Abdullah Juzaylan, Ali Abdul Mughni, and Abdul Latif Dayfallah. Immediately after the revolution, al-Sallal declared himself Commander-in-Chief of the Yemeni army and ruled the country alongside nine officers in a body known as the Revolutionary Command Council. Simultaneously, Muhammad Abdul Wahid informed the Egyptian chargé d'affaires of zero hour to notify Cairo.[62]

On 28 September 1962, a new government was formed in Sana'a.[69] One day earlier, the Revolutionary Command Council had announced over Sana'a Radio the fall of the Imamate and the establishment of a republican system.[70] According to the same announcement, al-Sallal was selected as President of the Yemeni Republic, Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.[69] The new leadership proclaimed the creation of a democratic, Islamic republican order based on social justice and the revival of Islamic Sharia. The announcement also called for the elimination of injustice and discrimination, and invited the population to participate in the reconstruction process.[71] Additional measures included army reform, a cultural and educational revolution to eliminate the remnants of backward eras, the encouragement of national capital, and the return of Yemeni emigrants.[71]

According to the revolutionary leadership's official statements, Yemen affirmed its commitment to Arab nationalism and pledged to pursue the unity of the Yemeni people as part of a broader comprehensive Arab unity within a single, democratic, popular-based Arab state.[71] The same statements emphasized the importance of Arab solidarity, support for the Arab League, and the need to increase the League's effectiveness.[71]

On the international level, the new leadership declared a policy of non-alignment, rejection of colonialism and foreign intervention in all their forms, adherence to international charters, and the establishment of friendly relations with other states based on mutual respect.[72]

According to contemporary academic sources, the revolutionary leadership claimed that the revolution received widespread popular support from Yemeni citizens.[73] On 31 October 1962, the Revolutionary Command Council issued a provisional constitution consisting of eleven articles, to remain in effect during a five-year transitional period. During this time, an electoral law and a permanent constitution were to be drafted.[73]

In the months that followed, the new government created a national bank for construction and development to finance industrial and commercial projects. On 24 November 1962, it also increased the salaries of army officers and state employees by amounts ranging from 100 to 150 per cent.[69]

According to academic sources, the Free Officers established a military tribunal which tried 600 former leaders of the Imamate regime.[74] On 27 September 1962, Yahya al-Samou', who had served as head of the Supreme Court under the Imam, was executed following his trial. Subsequently, former Foreign Minister Hassan Ibrahim and his assistant Abdul Rahman Abu Talib — the latter known for his close ties to the United States — faced trial as well.[74]

On 4 October 1962, Sana'a Radio broadcast the execution of three figures: Muhammad al-Shiham (Governor of Taiz), Muhammad al-Wazir (Director of Aviation), and Abdul Rahman al-Shami (al-Badr's personal bodyguard). According to the radio announcement, all three had been convicted by the People's Court. The same source reported that the total number of executions carried out by that date had reached 21 individuals.[75]

On 6 December 1962, the revolutionary government issued a compulsory military service law and created a council for tribal affairs. The same government also claimed to have removed privileged classes associated with the Imamate from official positions, abolished what it described as oppressive taxes, placed courts under popular supervision, and nationalized the lands and properties of the Imam's family.[69]

Following the revolution, al-Sallal met with representatives of several foreign diplomatic missions. He explained the revolution's objectives and justifications, and urged them to recommend that their governments support the new republic. He also assured the diplomats that the republic was committed to the United Nations Charter and to all previously concluded international treaties.[74]

Overthrow and civil war

[edit]

A week later rebels shelled his residence, Dar al-Bashair, in the Bir al-Azab district of Sanaa whence on September 26, 1962, Abdullah as-Sallal, whom al-Badr had appointed commander of the royal guard, staged a coup, and declared himself president of the Yemen Arab Republic.[76]

Al-Badr escaped to the north of North Yemen, and rallied tribes that supported him in opposition to Sallal. Fighting erupted between the two groups, starting the North Yemen Civil War. Al-Badr started getting support from Saudi Arabia, while the republicans received support from Egypt.[77][78]

Following the death of Imam Ahmad on 18 September 1962, Muhammad al-Badr was proclaimed Imam and King of Yemen.[79] The next day, 19 September, the ulama formally elected him as the new Imam.[80]

In his throne speech on 20 September, al-Badr announced that he would "uphold the law, help the oppressed, and lay the foundations of justice." He assured his subjects that laws would be developed under which "citizens will become equal in rights and duties." In foreign policy, Yemen would continue its policy of positive neutrality, remain faithful to the UN, the Arab League and the Bandung Conference, and strive for Arab unity.[81]

During his first days in power, al-Badr issued six decrees. The first two confirmed all ministers, governors and senior army officers in their posts. The third announced a full amnesty for all previous political offences. The fourth abolished the hostage system. The fifth cancelled all tax arrears unpaid before 1960. The sixth increased by half the salaries of soldiers and officers of the regular army and the tribal militia.[82]

Sheikhs of the leading tribes, representatives of major feudal families, religious figures, and members of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia declared their support for the new Imam. The Free Yemeni Movement, while not openly supporting him, welcomed his throne speech and the decrees on amnesty and the abolition of the hostage system.[83]

A few days after coming to power, al-Badr announced his intention to continue his father's policies and cooperate with his uncle, Emir al-Hassan. This marked a departure from his earlier promises and caused concern.[84] During this period, leaflets of the "Free Officers" organisation circulated, accusing the Crown Prince of failing to fulfil his promises regarding the army and foreign policy. An open letter from early 1962 condemned him for military cooperation with Jordan and for allegedly agreeing, in return for $20 million, to the establishment of American military bases in Taiz and Sana'a.[84] Yemeni students demonstrated in Sana'a against the alleged approval of American bases.[85]

Al-Badr's reign was abruptly interrupted on the night of 26 September by a military coup. Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal abolished the monarchy and proclaimed a republic.[86] In his communiqué No. 1, al-Sallal called for the overthrow of all monarchs and emirs of Arabia and the creation of a single republic on the Arabian Peninsula.[87]

The new republican authorities announced that King Muhammad al-Badr had died beneath the rubble of his palace.[88]

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his circle were aware of opposition within the Yemeni army and may have encouraged it, especially after July 1961, when relations between Egypt and monarchical Yemen sharply deteriorated. On 3 October 1962, the YAR government sent a telegram to Nasser confirming the 1956 Joint Defence Pact remained in force. Nasser replied that the UAR had begun implementing the pact from the first moments of the revolution.[84][89]

Radio Sana'a broadcast: "We are at the beginning of a new life — a life of freedom without tyranny."[88] It also reported that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had promised to support the revolutionary government against any attack. Nineteen Soviet ships carrying weapons for al-Sallal's soldiers lay anchored off the Yemeni coast.[88]

Al-Badr's uncle, Saif al-Islam Hassan, who had been abroad at the time of the coup, was proclaimed Imam upon hearing of al-Badr's alleged death. When Hassan learned al-Badr was alive in Saudi Arabia, he renounced his claim on 16 October and recognised al-Badr as the legitimate monarch.[90] Soon afterwards, the entire Bakil tribal confederation, together with most of the Hashid tribe controlling the central and northern highlands, joined the Imam and the royal princes in their struggle against the revolutionary regime.[1]

On 9 December 1962, the Yemeni princes and political leaders imposed strict limits on the secular and religious authority of Imam al-Badr, believing these restrictions necessary if the royalists were to win the war.[91]

On 3 December 1964, al-Badr gave an interview in a cave in northern Yemen. He expressed hope that the repeatedly delayed peace conference with the republican leadership would eventually take place. "I hope King Faisal can reach an agreement with Nasser," he said, "but the world must know that we cannot negotiate while an Egyptian pistol is held to our heads and Soviet aircraft circle in our sky."[92] A few weeks earlier, Nasser and Saudi King Faisal had agreed to hold a peace conference.[92]

Al-Badr accused Cairo of postponing the conference, which had been scheduled for 23 November 1964 at his headquarters with 169 delegates expected. "They are afraid that the republican delegates will support us," al-Badr said.[92] According to the Imam, some republican-appointed delegates had been arrested by the Egyptians. Al-Badr stated the royalist delegation was ready to meet and remained so. He said he would prefer to keep the royal family away from the conference to avoid accusations of excessive influence.[92]

The royalists would have preferred Saada or Hajjah as the venue, but were prepared to accept the Egyptians' choice of Haradh near the Saudi border. In his view, only two issues should be discussed: a complete ceasefire and the unconditional withdrawal of Egyptian forces as soon as possible.[92]

Through King Faisal, the royalists proposed a temporary settlement: a five-man council would replace the head of state. Both President al-Sallal and the Imam would step aside. The council would consist of two republicans, two royalists and one neutral person. This arrangement would remain until Egyptian troops were withdrawn.[92]

When al-Badr learned that republican officials said the Egyptians would need a year to withdraw 40,000 men, he commented: "Let them leave as quickly as they came." Once all Egyptians left, he said, a much larger conference should be held to decide the future form of government without foreign observers.[92]

In June 1968, the royalists decided to strip Imam al-Badr of all authority, leaving him only as a nominal head.[93]

Exile and death

[edit]

In 1970, al-Badr left the country and went to England.[94] According to Adel Darwish, a British-based Yemeni expert and friend of al-Badr, the deposed imam said a few years after arriving in Britain that he would return to Yemen only by invitation, and that he would never allow a civil war to rage again in his country.[1] He died in 1996 in London and was buried in Medina, Saudi Arabia.[95]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ In exile during the North Yemen Civil War, in northern Yemen between September 1962 and March 1969 and in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, between March 1969 and 1 December 1970
  2. ^ al-Badr did not formally abdicate until 1 December 1970, at which point Abdul Rahman al-Eryani was President of the Yemen Arab Republic
  3. ^ Arabic: محمد البدر. His full name was Al-Mansur Bi'llah Muhammad Al-Badr bin Al-Nasir-li-dinu'llah Ahmad (Arabic: المنصور بالله محمد البدر بن أحمد)

References

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Bibliography

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