On December 5, 1996, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in which he asked whether "irrational exuberance" had "unduly escalated asset values," a remark widely interpreted as a warning that equity markets were overvalued. At the time of the speech, the S&P 500 carried a ; by the end of 1999, that ratio had risen to 26.9, and the Nasdaq Composite had climbed from roughly 1,300 in 1996 to over 5,000 by March 2000. The Fed [did not begin raising the federal funds rate until June 1999]
(), more than two and a half years after the speech, ultimately raising rates six times through May 2000. After the Nasdaq collapsed, the Fed cut rates aggressively, .
The gap between Greenspan's stated concern about asset valuations in 1996 and the Fed's first rate response in mid-1999 is documented in the Fed's own published record, but economists disagree about what it indicates.
Given that Greenspan publicly signaled concern about equity valuations in December 1996 but the Fed did not raise rates in response until June 1999, what does the documented record show about the Fed's internal reasoning during that interval, and what have economists concluded about whether earlier or more aggressive rate action would have meaningfully altered the trajectory of the dot-com bubble?